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THE ABCD'S OF INDIANA LEGITIMATION LAW
In 1954, the state legislature, through the passage of the new Pro-
bate Code,1 repealed Indiana's legitimation statute.' The new provi-
sions were meant to improve the legal position of illegitimates. However,
the recent Indiana Court of Appeals decision in A-. B-. v. C-. D-.'
brought to light an unexpected detrimental bi-product of the current Pro-
bate Code. The repeal of Indiana's old legitimation statute, combined with
the appellate court's interpretation of the present probate statute in this
case, have, in effect, made illegitimacy a permanent status in Indiana.
There are presently no means by which the parents of an illegitimate child
can legitimate that child. This development has diverted Indiana from
its previous steady progress in the field of illegitimacy law and therefore
deserves critical examination.
REPEAL OF THE LEGITIMATION LAW
When the Probate Code Study Commission proposed the adoption of
its new Probate Code to the state legislature in 1953, its recommenda-
tion included the repeal of many of the old laws concerning inheritance.
A part of the Probate Code package was legislation repealing Indiana's
legitimation statute (§ 6-2310).' That law had provided for the legiti-
mation of children born out of wedlock, when the parents were sub-
sequently married to each other and the husband acknowledged the child
as his own.5 Indiana's legitimation statute had been included in the
1. Ch. 112, [1953] Ind. Acts 295, IND. CODE §§ 29-1-1-1 to 29-2-18-2 (1971),
IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 6-101 to 8-218 (1953).
2. Ch. 112, § 2501, [1953] Ind. Acts 409.
3. - Ind. App. -, 277 N.E.2d 599 (1971).
4. Ch. 112, § 2501, [1953] Ind. Acts 409.
5. "If a man shall marry the mother of an illegitimate child, and acknowledge it
as his own, such child shall be deemed legitimate." IND. ANN. STAT. § 6-2310 (1933).
In interpreting § 6-2310, the Indiana appellate court stated:
[W]here a man marries the mother of an illegitimate child, and acknowledges
the child as his own, the effect of the statute is to change the legal status of
the child from that of illegitimacy to legitimacy; that the status of the child
being thus fixed, stands for all purposes; that there are no degrees of legitimacy
in this State.
Harness v. Harness, 50 Ind. App. 364, 370, 98 N.E. 357, 359 (1912).
Provisions of this sort are quite common. H. KRAUSE, ILLEGITIMACY: LAW AND
SocIAL PoLIc 14 n.17 (1971) [hereinafter cited as KRAuSE]. Professor Krause lists 38
States, the District of Columbia and Puerto Rico as having legitimation statutes. Krause
incorrectly includes Indiana among these States, citing IND. ANN. STAT. § 3-656 (1968)
(IND. CODE § 31-4-2-1 (1971)) as authority. The cited statute only allows the parents
of a child born out of wedlock to change his surname from that of the mother to that of
the father if the parents marry each other. This is quite different from legitimation,
where the child takes on the status and rights of legitimacy rather than only the mere
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probate provisions because legitimation created inheritance rights which
did not extend to illegitimates.'
The section of the Probate Code meant to replace § 6-2310 was the
current § 6-207.' While the Commission might have felt that § 6-2310
had become superfluous in light of § 6-207, the appellate court decision
in A-. B-. v. C-. D-. makes it clear that § 6-2310 did some things
that § 6-207 cannot do.
A-. B-. v. C-. D-.
The plaintiff in A-. B-. v. C-. D-. had married the defendant's
former wife. While married to defendant, the wife became pregnant.
After the child was born the wife was divorced from defendant and was
given custody of the child. She then married plaintiff. Plaintiff sought a
declaratory judgment holding him to be the child's legitimate father on
the grounds that the defendant was not the biological father of the child,
therefore, the child was born out of wedlock, and that he, the plaintiff,
had married the child's mother and acknowledged the child as his own.'
The trial court granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment
on the grounds that plaintiff lacked standing to bring the action and that
the action was against public policy.'
appearance of it.
There are additional Indiana statutes allowing change of surname and issuance of
a new birth certificate upon the marriage of the parents. IND. CODE §§ 16-1-16-16, 16-1-
16-17, 16-4-1-1 to 16-4-1-3 (1971), IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 35-1816, 35-1817, 35-2125 to
35-2127 (1969). None of these statutes provide for legitimation, although, in providing
for the administrative formalities that normally accompany legitimation, they seem to
be based upon the assumption that the marriage of the parents makes the child legiti-
mate at common law. This assumption is erroneous. See note 14 infra.
6. IrD.. ANN. STAT. § 6-2309 (1933).
7. Illegitimate children.-(a) For the purpose of inheritance to, through and
from an illegitimate child, such child shall be treated the same as if he were
the legitimate child of his mother, so that he and his issue shall inherit from his
mother and from his maternal kindred, both descendants and collaterals, in all
degrees, and they may inherit from him. Such a child shall also be treated the
same as if he were a legitimate child of his mother for the purpose of deter-
mining homestead rights, and the making of family allowances.
(b) For the purpose of inheritance to, through and from an illegitimate
child, such child shall be treated the same as if he were the legitimate child of
his father, if but only if, (1) the paternity of such child has been established
by law, during the father's lifetime; or (2) if the putative father marries the
mother of the child and acknowledges the child to be his own.
IND. CODE § 29-1-2-7 (1971), IND. ANN. STAT. § 6-207 (1953).
8. A-. B-. v. C-. D-., - Ind. App. , , 277 N.E.2d 599, 601-602
(1971).
9. The trial court had transferred the case to the juvenile docket, and thus the
record is not public. In addition, the appellate court ordered the withholding from public
examination of "the record (transcript), briefs, and other papers in this case." -
Ind. App. at - , 277 N.E.2d at 619. Thus, the reasoning of the trial court is un-
available except as it is illuminated by the appellate opinion. With regard to the stand-
ing issue, the trial court apparently found plaintiff to be without any substantial present
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In reversing and remanding, the appellate court found that plaintiff
did have standing to raise the issues involved"0 and that no public policy
consideration barred the action." The court refused, however, to allow
the substance of plaintiff's request, holding that Indiana courts do not have
the power or authority to legitimate children born out of wedlock.' 2 While
it is clear that § 6-2310 would have allowed the trial court to legitimate
the child in this sort of situation, according to the appellate court § 6-207
does not have the same effect. Section 6-267 deals only with inheritance
rights and states merely that illegitimate children are to be treated "the
same as" if they were the legitimate children of their father or mother."3
To the appellate court this meant that § 6-207 dealt only with inheritance
rights of illegitimate children and in no way affected their status of illegi-
timacy. The common law is hostile to the non-legislative legitimation of
children born out of wedlock.' 4 Therefore, since statutes in derogation
of the common law are to be strictly construed, the appellate court felt
compelled to refuse plaintiff's request in the absence of specific legisla-
tion. 5 Apparently, the repeal of § 6-2310 cannot be remedied by judicial
action.
The appellate court decision to remand the case with these conclu-
interest in the relief sought. Id. at - , 277 N.E.2d at 608-609. As far as the public
policy issue was concerned, the appellate court felt that the trial court's ruling was
related to the presumption of legitimacy that attaches to a child born of a married
woman. Id. at - , 277 N.E.2d at 613.
10. - Ind. App. at - , 277 N.E.2d at 612. Plaintiff had originally sought
standing on the ground that he had a right to legitimate the child. The appellate court
rejected this argument, but held that there was at issue a "legal relation[ship] . . .
affected by a statute" and thus plaintiff had standing under Indiana's Declaratory Judg-
ment Act, IND. CODE § 34-4-10-2 (1971), IND. ANN. STAT. § 3-1102 (1968). The par-
ticular statute involved allows a father whose paternity has been established to inherit
from his illegitimate child. IND. CODE § 29-1-2-7 (1971), IND. ANN. STAT. § 6-207
(1968). See note 7 supra. The appellate court decided that the expectancy interest in
the child's estate was sufficient to give the plaintiff standing to show that he was the
natural father of the child. Ind. App. at - , 277 N.E.2d at 610.
11. - Ind. App. at -, 277 N.E.2d at 614. While the presumption of legiti-
macy of a child born of a married woman is unassailable in some states, Indiana has
allowed the presumption to be questioned in court, provided that the interests of the
child are protected. Thus, in A-. B-. v. C-. D-., the court required that the child
be joined as a party so that his interests would be fully represented. Id. at - , 277
N.E.2d at 619. See P. v. Department of Health, 200 Misc. 1090, 1094-95, 107 N.Y.S.2d
586, 591 (1951).
12. - Ind. App. at - , 277 N.F_.2d at 603. A-. B-. v. C-. D-. is appar-
ently the first case in which the issue of the court's power to grant legitimation was
considered. Moreover, the appellate court raised the issue on its own.
13. - Ind. App. at - , 277 N.E.2d at 604-606.
14. "A bastard may, lastly, be made legitimate, and capable of inheriting, by the
transcendent power of an act of parliament and not otherwise." 1 W. BLACKSTONE, CoU-
MENTARiES* 459. In A-. B-. v. C-. D-., the court made it clear that the common law
rule set forth by Blackstone is in force in Indiana. - Ind .App. at - , 277 N.E.2d
at 603.
15. - Ind. App. at - , 277 N.E.2d at 606.
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sions of law leaves the plantiff in an undesirable position should he decide
to press the case further on remand. If the defendant's presumptive pater-
nity"0 is not overcome at trial, the child will still be regarded as the de-
fendant's legitimate son. Alternatively, plaintiff can, with sufficient evi-
dence, 7 overcome defendant's presumptive paternity and the child would
then be deemed illegitimate. At the same time the plaintiff can seek to
establish his own paternity and have himself declared the father of the
child, in which case the boy would be his illegitimate son.
Since adoption removes the legal burdens of illegitimacy and nor-
malizes the family relationship in all respects, 8 it is important to examine
the relationship of state adoption proceedings to plaintiff's alternatives. If
the plaintiff pursues the matter on remand, adoption becomes more or less
feasible depending upon the trial result. If the defendant succeeds in up-
holding his presumption of paternity, plaintiff would need defendant's
permission to adopt the child.' On the other hand, if plaintiff rebuts de-
fendant's presumption of paternity, defendant's consent would no longer
be an obstacle to adoption, since Indiana law requires only the consent of
the mother to adopt a child born out of wedlock."0
The problem with so employing the adoption procedure is that such
use creates and perpetuates legal fiction. In simple terms, the plaintiff
may be adopting his own son. The adoption laws clearly do not envision
this possibility. Indiana law requires that, before adoption can proceed,
notice be given to the father of the illegitimate child, if he is known, and,
16. Since the child's mother was married to defendant at the time of the child's
birth, the law presumes the defendant's paternity. See Buchanan v. Buchanan, - Ind.
App. -, 267 N.E.2d 155 (1971).
17. Blood tests had shown that the putative father could not have been the bio-
logical father. - Ind. App. at - , 277 N.E.2d at 618.
18. IND. CODE § 31-3-1-9 (1971), IND. ANN. STAT. § 3-122 (1968).
19. IND. ConE § 31-3-1-6 (1971), IND. ANN. STAT. § 3-120 (Supp. 1972).
The person seeking to adopt the child has the burden of proving that the living
parents of the child have violated their natural and legal obligations to the
child in such a manner that they come within the terms of the Indiana statute
authorizing waiver of consent of the natural parents. If what the parents have
done or have failed to do is not named in the statute as grounds for dispensing
with consent, then the child simply cannot be adopted without the parents' con-
sent.
Note, Dispensing With Parental Consent in Indiana Adoption Proceedings, 40 IND. LJ.
378, 379 (1965). See also Emmons v. Dinelli, 235 Ind. 249, 133 N.E.2d 56 (1956).
20. IND. CODE § 31-3-1-6 (1971), IND. ANN. STAT. § 3-120 (Supp. 1972). But see
Stanley v. Illinois, - U.S. - , 92 S. Ct. 1208 (1972). Stanley recognized a sub-
stantial interest of the unwed father in retaining custody of his illegitimate children
after the death of the natural mother. Id. at - , 92 S. Ct. at 1213. This ruling may
mean that unwed fathers' rights regarding the adoption of their children are constitu-
tionally protected, and, therefore, that their consent to adoption is also required. In
the context of A-. B-. v. C-. D-., this would not present a problem since the plain-
tiff, the unwed father, would undoubtedly give his consent to adoption.
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that the father may appear at the hearing to voice any possible objection
he might have to the adoption."' Thus, the plaintiff in our situation might
be required to acquiesce in his own act. Statutes in the family law area
should mirror reality, not distort it.
THE NEED FOR NEW LEGITIMATION LEGISLATION
A-. B-. v. C-. D-. point, to a legislative vacuum that needs to
be filled. There are three reasons why Indiana needs either a new legiti-
mation statute or re-enactment of old § 6-2310. First, the absence of a
legitimation statute creates an unreasonable exception to the law's general
scheme of restricting the class of children deemed illegitimate to a mini-
mum. Second, the lack of such a statute means a deprivation of some of
the rights accorded legitimate children. Third, this deprivation raises a
Constitutional question of over-breadth with regard to the entire class-
ification of illegitimacy.
An Unreasonable Exception
If, as the appellate court suggested, repeal of Indiana's legitimation
statute was based on the mistaken assumption that § 6-207 would do all
that § 6-2310 did, then re-enactment is called for on the ground that the
legislature has been proven wrong. Repeal did change Indiana's legiti-
macy law significantly. But to change the law so as to prevent legitima-
tion in cases where a child's parents marry after his birth is inconsistent
with other Indiana law on illegitimacy.22 Under present Indiana law, a
child is legitimate if his parents marry after conception but prior to birth,"
if he is conceived of a void or annulled marriage,"4 or if he is a child of
a common law marriage.25 The inconsistency of preventing legitima-
tion of a child whose parents are married to each other and who recognize
the child as their own seems particularly unreasonable in cases like A-.
B-. v. C-. D-. where marriage prior to birth is not possible, i.e., when
the father is not available or marriage is prevented by the existence of a
21. IND. CODE § 31-3-1-6(h) (1971), IND. ANN. STAT. § 3-120 (Supp. 1972).
22. Indiana's Children Born Out of Wedlock Act is prefaced with the statement
that:
It is the obligation of the state of Indiana to provide proper legal procedures
that will enable children born out of wedlock to have proper care, maintenance,
education, protection, support and opportunities the same as children born in
wedlock ...
IND. CODE § 31-4-1-1 (1971), IND. ANN. STAT. § 3-323 (1968). Indiana's position in
these cases is also inconsistent with trends throughout the country. See KRAUSE, supra
note 5, at 9.
23. Doyle v. State ex rel. Shetterly, 61 Ind. 324, 326-27 (1878).
24. IND. CODE §§ 31-1-7-2, 31-1-7-3, 31-1-7-6 (1971), IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 44-107,
44-108, 44-106 (1968).
25. IND. CODE § 31-1-6-2 (1971), IND. ANN. STAT. § 44-112 (1968).
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prior marriage not yet dissolved. In such cases legitimation would seem
to be the consistent and reasonable approach.
The Denial of Substantive Rights
It might be argued that the distinction between legitimacy and illeg-
itimacy is no longer an important one since Indiana has taken important
steps toward equalizing the treatment of all children, legitimate or not."8
However, the distinction does have adverse legal consequences.
For example, the Probate Code defines "child" to include legitimate
children and adopted children, but not illegitimate children except for
purposes of § 6-207." When applied to the pretermitted children section
of the Code," this definition effectively prohibits illegitimate children
from taking an intestate share of a parent's estate against a will executed
before their birth which unintentionally excludes them. This result makes
sense in terms of illegitimate children for whom paternity has never
been established or where a paternity suit led only to a support decree.
Since a father probably would not want to make a public record of his
relationship to the illegitimate child, it might be expected that the child
would be excluded from specific mention in his father's will for the sake of
discretion. If the Pretermitted Heir statute included illegitimate children,
specific mention of the illegitimate child would be necessary if the father
wished to exclude that child from his will. A case can be made that this
child should be prevented from disrupting his father's will by claiming an
intestate share of the estate. However, this reasoning does not apply
when the parents marry and acknowledge the child as their own subse-
quent to its birth. In that case, the father would have no misgivings about
specifically mentioning the child in his will.
Another example of the legal consequences of an "illegitimate" classi-
fication is the wrongful death action. Under Indiana law the father of an
26. Examples may be found in the Children Born Out of Wedlock Act, IND. CODE
§8 31-4-1-1 to 31-4-2-2 (1971), IxD. ANN. STAT. §§ 3-623 to 3-658 (1968).
27. The term "child" is defined as including "an adopted child," but the term does
not include "a grandchild or other more remote descendants, nor, except as provided in
section 205 [§ 6-205], an illegitimate child." IND. CODE § 29-1-1-3 (1971), IND. ANN.
STAT. § 6-103 (1968). The reference to § 6-205, which deals with the inheritance rights.
of kindred of the half-blood, is clearly an error. It should refer to § 6-207, which deals
with illegitimates.
28. When a testator fails to provide in his will for any of his children born
or adopted after the making of his last will, such child, whether born before
or after the testator's death, shall receive a share in the estate of the testator
equal in value to that which he would have received if the testator had died
intestate, unless it appears from the will that such omission was intentional,
or unless when the will was executed the testator had one (1) or more chil-
dren known to him to be living and devised substantially all his estate to the
spouse who survives him.
IND. CODE § 29-1-3-8(a) (1971), IND. ANN. STAT. § 6-308(a) (1968).
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illegitimate child may not maintain an action for the wrongful death of
this child, even though he has acknowledged and supported the child."
This distinction may be valid if the father has never married the child's
mother and never lived with the child. Such a result makes little sense,
however, where the parents are married to each other and raise the child
as would any other parents.
Finally, classifying a child as illegitimate gives rise to a host of
potential conflict of laws problems that may cause a forfeiture of some of
the rights a child would have had in Indiana30 prior to the repeal of §
6-2310.
In sum, being classified as illegitimate results in the denial of sub-
stantive rights accorded to legitimate children. The denial is clearly un-
reasonable in terms of children who could have been legitimated under §
6-2310.
Constitutional Protections
The preceding sections have suggested that the absence of a legitima-
tion statute seems to be an inconsistent and unreasonable situation which
denies certain rights. This result requires examination of the fourteenth
amendment and the protections it affords those unreasonably denied rights
enjoyed by others.
Under the fourteenth amendment, statutory classifications which
are too broad or over-inclusive may be held unconstitutional."' A statu-
29. L. T. Dickason Coal Co. v. Liddil, 49 Ind. App. 40, 45-46, 94 N.E. 411, 413.
(1911). The case gives the right to bring the action to the child's "next of kin" and ex-
cludes the putative father from that group.
30. [G]reat population mobility makes the following question possible: "what
are the rights of a child born out of wedlock under the laws of State #1, who
now lives in State #2 which gives no legal relevance to illegitimacy, and who
seeks to inherit from his father who died without a will, if the father was
domiciled in State #3 which denied illegitimates any right to inherit from their
fathers, died in State #4 which allows any illegitimate child to inherit if his
paternity was established by court action during the father's lifetime, and
left realty and personal property in all four States ?"
KRAUSE, supra note 5, at 10.
31. KRAUSE, supra note 5, at 60-61. The over-inclusive-under-inclusive test was
the first one developed in the Supreme Court's interpretation and application of the
fourteenth amendment. See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896). This test is suf-
ficient to cover the discrimination dealt with in this note. However, the Supreme Court
has recently added another consideration to the equal protection issue; if the state can-
not show that there is a rational connection between the discrimination in a statute and
its purpose then the statute violates the equal protection clause. Railway Express
Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106 (1949). This rational basis standard was first
applied to the area of illegitimacy law in Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1967), and
Glona v. American Guar. & Liab. Ins. Co., 391 U.S. 73 (1967). These companion cases
dealt with the power of Louisiana to deny the benefits of its wrongful death statute to
illegitimate children. The Court held the statute unconstitutional on the ground that
the purpose of the discrimination, to deter the birth of illegitimate children, could not
be effectuated by the discrimination involved. 391 U.S. at 72. However, in Labine v.
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tory classification is over-inclusive if within its scope it includes persons
that should not reasonably be included. 2 A frequently cited case dealing
with the problem of over-inclusion is Aptheker v. Secretary of State,"
which struck down, under the fifth amendment, a federal law revoking
petitioners' passports on the ground that a group classified in terms of
membership in the Communist Party included within it a great variety of
persons who shared little besides membership. The classification failed to
take into consideration the varying degrees of party affiliation in light of
the underlying purpose behind the law-to protect the government from
violent overthrow by certain radical factions of the Communist Party."
In a like manner, Indiana's classification of illegitimate children is over-
inclusive. Included among "illegitimate" children are those who live in a
normal family environment with their biological parents, who are married
to each other."
According to A-. B-. v. C-. D-., the repeal of § 6-2310 ex-
panded the "illegitimate" classification to include children who, for a
period of 123 years, would have been deemed legitimate under state law.
When, and if, a child so situated is denied the enjoyment of the rights of
a legitimate child (or his father is excluded from rights enjoyed by legiti-
Vincent, 401 U.S. 532 (1971), the Court retreated from its previous position. Labine in-
volved the constitutionality of Louisiana's intestate succession statute, which denied an
illegitimate child the right to inherit from his father. The Court stated that it was not
for the Court to examine the rationality of Louisiana's statute. Id. at 538.
[T]here is nothing in the vague generalities of the Equal Protection and Due
Process Clauses which empower this Court to nullify the deliberate choices of
the elected representatives of the people of Louisiana.
Id. at 539-40.
In Stanley v. Illinois, - U.S. - , 92 S. Ct. 1208 (1972), discussed at note 20
supra, the Court again changed its position. In Stanley, the Court relied heavily on the
due process clause in stating that although a statute's purpose is in accord with consti-
tutional requirements, the means employed to achieve that purpose must be rational.
Id. at - , 92 S. Ct. at 1213. Finally, in Gomez v. Perez, - U.S. - , 93 S. Ct. 872
(1973), the Court used the broadest language to date in dealing with the rights of
illegitimates. Relying on earlier decisions, the Court stated that "a State may not in-
vidiously discriminate against illegitimate children by denying them substantial benefits
accorded children generally." Id. at - , 93 S. Ct. at 875. This language seems to say
that any denial of a substantial right to illegitimates is per se invidious discrimination.
This would be true regardless of the state's purpose in discriminating. Gonez does not
mention Labine, but its effect may be to overrule Labine Jubsilento.
32. KRAusE, supra note 5, at 60-61. For a general discussion of over-inclusion
and the fourteenth amendment, see Tussman & tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the
Laws, 37 CALIF. L. REv. 341 (1949).
33. 378 U.S. 500 (1964).
34. Id. at 510-512.
35. See notes 27-29 supra & text accompanying. Since this note deals with the
subject of legitimation, it does not attempt to determine if the classification as illegiti-
mate of children situated differently, i.e., those who live with unmarried parents, those
for whom paternity has been established, etc., might violate the over-inclusive standard
as well. The law is certainly overbroad with regard to children formerly legitimated. It
may also be overbroad in regard to others.
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mate fathers), that child will have 'a strong Constitutional argument
against the law that denies him those rights: the Indiana illegitimacy
classification is too broad in that it includes within its scope children
against whom the state has no rational basis for discriminating. As was
noted earlier in the cases of the Pretermitted Heir section of the Probate
Code and wrongful death actions, the reasons for denying illegitimates and
their fathers certain rights may make sense in terms of some children born
out of wedlock, but they do not make sense in terms of those formerly
covered by the legitimation statute. Therefore, the classification should
be re-drawn so as to be more reasonably related to the purposes of the
statutes which employ it.
CONCLUSION
Until its repeal in 1954, § 6-2310 and its forerunners had been the
law of the state since 1831. It was repealed in the mistaken belief that the
statute put in its place would serve the same purpose. Repeal of this legi-
timation statute subjects children and their parents to needless difficulty
and may lead to the outright denial of rights to which they are reason-
ably entitled. Furthermore, the repeal of this statute makes the entire
illegitimacy classification constitutionally suspect and may thus proauce
needless litigation. All of these facts point to the need for prompt re-
enactment of § 6-2310 or similar legislation.
It was in part the stated purpose of the Probate Code Study Com-
mission to "erase the Scarlet Letter" of illegitimacy." Instead of achiev-
ing that goal, for many they made that letter an indelible one. It is now
up to a future legislature to correct that mistake.
JoaN E. SEDDELMEYER
36. INDIANA PROBATE CODE STUDY COMMISSION, PROPOSED NEW PROBATE CODE, pt.
II, 16 (1952).
